修身

下午3点多就有人在街上放鞭炮了。。。。

刚才在safeway被一个大妈喊: honey， 寒死我了。。。。

下午在天涯上看到几个帖子，very inspiring

牛人做的上海倒楼模拟


good one:
Nissan Altima 可爱车
Ford Fusion 车祸车
Toyota Camery 买菜车
Toyota Prius 棺材车

rocking body

"潘驴邓小闲"，今儿第一次听到这个，很神。。。

 葫芦娃历险记

    

《新宿事件》，吴彦祖身上果然有股邪劲儿; 到头来都是一场空。How much different am I from them??

a joke:
7月1日，空客公司以及世界航空理事会致函中国发改委，请求中国发改委不要随意上调油价，至少要提前通知。原因为6.1号发改委上调油价，空客一架飞机落海，6.30号发改委上调油价，又一架空客落海……下次发改委如果再调油价，全球空客暂时停飞一天

From tech stocks to high gas prices, Goldman Sachs has engineered every major market manipulation since the Great Depression - and they're about to do it again

    By MATT TAIBBI

    The first thing you need to know about Goldman Sachs is that it's everywhere. The world's most powerful investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money. In fact, the history of the recent financial crisis, which doubles as a history of the rapid decline and fall of the suddenly swindled-dry American empire, reads like a Who's Who of Goldman Sachs graduates.

    By now, most of us know the major players. As George Bush's last Treasury secretary, former Goldman CEO Henry Paulson was the architect of the bailout, a suspiciously self-serving plan to funnel trillions of Your Dollars to a handful of his old friends on Wall Street. Robert Rubin, Bill Clinton's former Treasury secretary, spent 26 years at Goldman before becoming chairman of Citigroup - which in turn got a $300 billion taxpayer bailout from Paulson. There's John Thain, the rear end in a top hat chief of Merrill Lynch who bought an $87,000 area rug for his office as his company was imploding; a former Goldman banker, Thain enjoyed a multibillion-dollar handout from Paulson, who used billions in taxpayer funds to help Bank of America rescue Thain's sorry company. And Robert Steel, the former Goldmanite head of Wachovia, scored himself and his fellow executives $225 million in golden parachute payments as his bank was self-destructing. There's Joshua Bolten, Bush's chief of staff during the bailout, and Mark Patterson, the current Treasury chief of staff, who was a Goldman lobbyist just a year ago, and Ed Liddy, the former Goldman director whom Paulson put in charge of bailed-out insurance giant AIG, which forked over $13 billion to Goldman after Liddy came on board. The heads of the Canadian and Italian national banks are Goldman alums, as is the head of the World Bank, the head of the New York Stock Exchange, the last two heads of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York - which, incidentally, is now in charge of overseeing Goldman - not to mention ...

    But then, any attempt to construct a narrative around all the former Goldmanites in influential positions quickly becomes an absurd and pointless exercise, like trying to make a list of everything. What you need to know is the big picture: If America is circling the drain, Goldman Sachs has found a way to be that drain - an extremely unfortunate loophole in the system of Western democratic capitalism, which never foresaw that in a society governed passively by free markets and free elections, organized greed always defeats disorganized democracy.

    The bank's unprecedented reach and power have enabled it to turn all of America into a giant pump-and-dump scam, manipulating whole economic sectors for years at a time, moving the dice game as this or that market collapses, and all the time gorging itself on the unseen costs that are breaking families everywhere - high gas prices, rising consumer-credit rates, half-eaten pension funds, mass layoffs, future taxes to pay off bailouts. All that money that you're losing, it's going somewhere, and in both a literal and a figurative sense, Goldman Sachs is where it's going: The bank is a huge, highly sophisticated engine for converting the useful, deployed wealth of society into the least useful, most wasteful and insoluble substance on Earth - pure profit for rich individuals.

    They achieve this using the same playbook over and over again. The formula is relatively simple: Goldman positions itself in the middle of a speculative bubble, selling investments they know are crap. Then they hoover up vast sums from the middle and lower floors of society with the aid of a crippled and corrupt state that allows it to rewrite the rules in exchange for the relative pennies the bank throws at political patronage. Finally, when it all goes bust, leaving millions of ordinary citizens broke and starving, they begin the entire process over again, riding in to rescue us all by lending us back our own money at interest, selling themselves as men above greed, just a bunch of really smart guys keeping the wheels greased. They've been pulling this same stunt over and over since the 1920s - and now they're preparing to do it again, creating what may be the biggest and most audacious bubble yet. ...

    IF AMERICA IS NOW CIRCLING THE DRAIN, GOLDMAN SACHS HAS FOUND A WAY TO BE THAT DRAIN.

    BUBBLE #1 - THE GREAT DEPRESSION
    Goldman wasn't always a too-big-to-fail Wall Street behemoth, the ruthless face of kill-or-be-killed capitalism on steroids - just almost always. The bank was actually founded in 1869 by a German immigrant named Marcus Goldman, who built it up with his son-in-law Samuel Sachs. They were pioneers in the use of commercial paper, which is just a fancy way of saying they made money lending out short-term IOUs to small-time vendors in downtown Manhattan.

    You can probably guess the basic plotline of Goldman's first 100 years in business: plucky, immigrant-led investment bank beats the odds, pulls itself up by its bootstraps, makes shitloads of money. In that ancient history there's really only one episode that bears scrutiny now, in light of more recent events: Goldman's disastrous foray into the speculative mania of pre-crash Wall Street in the late 1920s.

    This great Hindenburg of financial history has a few features that might sound familiar. Back then, the main financial tool used to bilk investors was called an "investment trust." Similar to modern mutual funds, the trusts took the cash of investors large and small and (theoretically, at least) invested it in a smorgasbord of Wall Street securities, though the securities and amounts were often kept hidden from the public. So a regular guy could invest $10 or $100 in a trust and feel like he was a big player. Much as in the 1990s, when new vehicles like day trading and e-trading attracted reams of new suckers from the sticks who wanted to feel like big shots, investment trusts roped a new generation of regular-guy investors into the speculation game.

    Beginning a pattern that would repeat itself over and over again, Goldman got into the investment-trust game late, then jumped in with both feet and went hog-wild. The first effort was the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation; the bank issued a million shares at $100 apiece, bought all those shares with its own money and then sold 90 percent of them to the hungry public at $104. The trading corporation then relentlessly bought shares in itself, bidding the price up further and further. Eventually it dumped part of its holdings and sponsored a new trust, the Shenandoah Corporation, issuing millions more in shares in that fund - which in turn sponsored yet another trust called the Blue Ridge Corporation. In this way, each investment trust served as a front for an endless investment pyramid: Goldman hiding behind Goldman hiding behind Goldman. Of the 7,250,000 initial shares of Blue Ridge, 6,250,000 were actually owned by Shenandoah - which, of course, was in large part owned by Goldman Trading.

    The end result (ask yourself if this sounds familiar) was a daisy chain of borrowed money, one exquisitely vulnerable to a decline in performance anywhere along the line ....

    BUBBLE #2 - TECH STOCKS
    Fast-Forward about 65 years. Goldman not only survived the crash that wiped out so many of the investors it duped, it went on to become the chief underwriter to the country's wealthiest and most powerful corporations. Thanks to Sidney Weinberg, who rose from the rank of janitor's assistant to head the firm, Goldman became the pioneer of the initial public offering, one of the principal and most lucrative means by which companies raise money. During the 1970s and 1980s, Goldman may not have been the planet-eating Death Star of political influence it is today, but it was a top-drawer firm that had a reputation for attracting the very smartest talent on the Street.

    It also, oddly enough, had a reputation for relatively solid ethics and a patient approach to investment that shunned the fast buck; its executives were trained to adopt the firm's mantra, "long-term greedy." One former Goldman banker who left the firm in the early Nineties recalls seeing his superiors give up a very profitable deal on the grounds that it was a long-term loser. "We gave back money to 'grownup' corporate clients who had made bad deals with us," he says. "Everything we did was legal and fair - but 'long-term greedy' said we didn't want to make such a profit at the clients' collective expense that we spoiled the marketplace." ...

    But then, something happened. It's hard to say what it was exactly; it might have been the fact that Goldman's co-chairman in the early Nineties, Robert Rubin, followed Bill Clinton to the White House, where he directed the National Economic Council and eventually became Treasury secretary. ...

    Rubin was the prototypical Goldman banker. He was probably born in a $4,000 suit, he had a face that seemed permanently frozen just short of an apology for being so much smarter than you, and he exuded a Spock-like, emotion-neutral exterior; the only human feeling you could imagine him experiencing was a nightmare about being forced to fly coach. It became almost a national cliche that whatever Rubin thought was best for the economy - a phenomenon that reached its apex in 1999, when Rubin appeared on the cover of Time with his Treasury deputy, Larry Summers, and Fed chief Alan Greenspan under the headline THE COMMITTEE TO SAVE THE WORLD. And "what Rubin thought," mostly, was that the American economy, and in particular the financial markets, were over-regulated and needed to be set free. ...

    The basic scam in the Internet Age is pretty easy even for the financially illiterate to grasp. Companies that weren't much more than pot-fueled ideas scrawled on napkins by up-too-late bong-smokers were taken public via IPOs, hyped in the media and sold to the public for megamillions. It was as if banks like Goldman were wrapping ribbons around watermelons, tossing them out 50-story windows and opening the phones for bids. In this game you were a winner only if you took your money out before the melon hit the pavement.

    It sounds obvious now, but what the average investor didn't know at the time was that the banks had changed the rules of the game, making the deals look better than they actually were. They did this by setting up what was, in reality, a two-tiered investment system - one for the insiders who knew the real numbers, and another for the lay investor who was invited to chase soaring prices the banks themselves knew were irrational. While Goldman's later pattern would be to capitalize on changes in the regulatory environment, its key innovation in the Internet years was to abandon its own industry's standards of quality control.

    "Since the Depression, there were strict underwriting guidelines that Wall Street adhered to when taking a company public," says one prominent hedge-fund manager. "The company had to be in business for a minimum of five years, and it had to show profitability for three consecutive years. But Wall Street took these guidelines and threw them in the trash." Goldman completed the snow job by pumping up the sham stocks: "Their analysts were out there saying Bullshit.com is worth $100 a share."

    The problem was, nobody told investors that the rules had changed. "Everyone on the inside knew," the manager says. "Bob Rubin sure as hell knew what the underwriting standards were. They'd been intact since the 1930s." ...

    Goldman has denied that it changed its underwriting standards during the Internet years, but its own statistics belie the claim. Just as it did with the investment trust in the 1920s, Goldman started slow and finished crazy in the Internet years. After it took a little-known company with weak financials called Yahoo! public in 1996, once the tech boom had already begun, Goldman quickly became the IPO king of the Internet era. Of the 24 companies it took public in 1997, a third were losing money at the time of the IPO. In 1999, at the height of the boom, it took 47 companies public, including stillborns like Webvan and eToys, investment offerings that were in many ways the modern equivalents of Blue Ridge and Shenandoah. The following year, it underwrote 18 companies in the first four months, 14 of which were money losers at the time. As a leading underwriter of Internet stocks during the boom, Goldman provided profits far more volatile than those of its competitors: In 1999, the average Goldman IPO leapt 281 percent above its offering price, compared to the Wall Street average of 181 percent.

    How did Goldman achieve such extraordinary results? One answer is that they used a practice called "laddering," which is just a fancy way of saying they manipulated the share price of new offerings. Here's how it works: Say you're Goldman Sachs, and Bullshit.com comes to you and asks you to take their company public. You agree on the usual terms: You'll price the stock, determine how many shares should be released and take the Bullshit.com CEO on a "road show" to schmooze investors, all in exchange for a substantial fee (typically six to seven percent of the amount raised). You then promise your best clients the right to buy big chunks of the IPO at the low offering price - let's say Bullshit.com's starting share price is $15 - in exchange for a promise that they will buy more shares later on the open market. That seemingly simple demand gives you inside knowledge of the IPO's future, knowledge that wasn't disclosed to the day-trader schmucks who only had the prospectus to go by: You know that certain of your clients who bought X amount of shares at $15 are also going to buy Y more shares at $20 or $25, virtually guaranteeing that the price is going to go to $25 and beyond. In this way, Goldman could artificially jack up the new company's price, which of course was to the bank's benefit - a six percent fee of a $500 million IPO is serious money.

    Goldman was repeatedly sued by shareholders for engaging in laddering in a variety of Internet IPOs, including Webvan and NetZero. The deceptive practices also caught the attention of Nichol as Maier, the syndicate manager of Cramer & Co., the hedge fund run at the time by the now-famous chattering television rear end in a top hat Jim Cramer, himself a Goldman alum. ...

    "Goldman, from what I witnessed, they were the worst perpetrator," Maier said. "They totally fueled the bubble. And it's specifically that kind of behavior that has caused the market crash. They built these stocks upon an illegal foundation - manipulated up - and ultimately, it really was the small person who ended up buying in." In 2005, Goldman agreed to pay $40 million for its laddering violations - a puny penalty relative to the enormous profits it made. (Goldman, which has denied wrongdoing in all of the cases it has settled, refused to respond to questions for this story.)

    Another practice Goldman engaged in during the Internet boom was "spinning," better known as bribery. Here the investment bank would offer the executives of the newly public company shares at extra-low prices, in exchange for future underwriting business. Banks that engaged in spinning would then undervalue the initial offering price - ensuring that those "hot" opening price shares it had handed out to insiders would be more likely to rise quickly, supplying bigger first-day rewards for the chosen few. So instead of Bullshit.com opening at $20, the bank would approach the Bullshit.com CEO and offer him a million shares of his own company at $18 in exchange for future business - effectively robbing all of Bullshit's new shareholders by diverting cash that should have gone to the company's bottom line into the private bank account of the company's CEO. ...

    Such practices conspired to turn the Internet bubble into one of the greatest financial disasters in world history: Some $5 trillion of wealth was wiped out on the NASDAQ alone. But the real problem wasn't the money that was lost by shareholders, it was the money gained by investment bankers, who received hefty bonuses for tampering with the market. Instead of teaching Wall Street a lesson that bubbles always deflate, the Internet years demonstrated to bankers that in the age of freely flowing capital and publicly owned financial companies, bubbles are incredibly easy to inflate, and individual bonuses are actually bigger when the mania and the irrationality are greater.

    GOLDMAN SCAMMED HOUSING INVESTORS BY BETTING AGAINST ITS OWN CRAPPY MORTGAGES.

    Nowhere was this truer than at Goldman. Between 1999 and 2002, the firm paid out $28.5 billion in compensation and benefits - an average of roughly $350,000 a year per employee. Those numbers are important because the key legacy of the Internet boom is that the economy is now driven in large part by the pursuit of the enormous salaries and bonuses that such bubbles make possible. Goldman's mantra of "long-term greedy" vanished into thin air as the game became about getting your check before the melon hit the pavement.

    The market was no longer a rationally managed place to grow real, profitable businesses: It was a huge ocean of Someone Else's Money where bankers hauled in vast sums through whatever means necessary and tried to convert that money into bonuses and payouts as quickly as possible. If you laddered and spun 50 Internet IPOs that went bust within a year, so what? By the time the Securities and Exchange Commission got around to fining your firm $110 million, the yacht you bought with your IPO bonuses was already six years old. Besides, you were probably out of Goldman by then, running the U.S. Treasury or maybe the state of New Jersey. (One of the truly comic moments in the history of America's recent financial collapse came when Gov. Jon Corzine of New Jersey, who ran Goldman from 1994 to 1999 and left with $320 million in IPO-fattened stock, insisted in 2002 that "I've never even heard the term 'laddering' before.")

    For a bank that paid out $7 billion a year in salaries, $110 million fines issued half a decade late were something far less than a deterrent - they were a joke. Once the Internet bubble burst, Goldman had no incentive to reassess its new, profit-driven strategy; it just searched around for another bubble to inflate. As it turns out, it had one ready, thanks in large part to Rubin.

    BUBBLE #3 - THE HOUSING CRAZE
    Goldman's role in the sweeping disaster that was the housing bubble is not hard to trace. Here again, the basic trick was a decline in underwriting standards, although in this case the standards weren't in IPOs but in mortgages. ...

    None of that would have been possible without investment bankers like Goldman, who created vehicles to package those lovely mortgages and sell them en masse to unsuspecting insurance companies and pension funds. This created a mass market for toxic debt that would never have existed before; in the old days, no bank would have wanted to keep some addict ex-con's mortgage on its books, knowing how likely it was to fail. You can't write these mortgages, in other words, unless you can sell them to someone who doesn't know what they are.

    Goldman used two methods to hide the mess they were selling. First, they bundled hundreds of different mortgages into instruments called Collateralized Debt Obligations. Then they sold investors on the idea that, because a bunch of those mortgages would turn out to be OK, there was no reason to worry so much about the lovely ones: The CDO, as a whole, was sound. Thus, junk-rated mortgages were turned into AAA-rated investments. Second, to hedge its own bets, Goldman got companies like AIG to provide insurance - known as credit-default swaps - on the CDOs. The swaps were essentially a racetrack bet between AIG and Goldman: Goldman is betting the ex-cons will default, AIG is betting they won't.

    There was only one problem with the deals: All of the wheeling and dealing represented exactly the kind of dangerous speculation that federal regulators are supposed to rein in. Derivatives like CDOs and credit swaps had already caused a series of serious financial calamities: Procter & Gamble and Gibson Greetings both lost fortunes, and Orange County, California, was forced to default in 1994. A report that year by the Government Accountability Office recommended that such financial instruments be tightly regulated - and in 1998, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a woman named Brooksley Born, agreed. That May, she circulated a letter to business leaders and the Clinton administration suggesting that banks be required to provide greater disclosure in derivatives trades, and maintain reserves to cushion against losses. ...

    Clinton's reigning economic foursome - "especially Rubin," according to Greenberger - called Born in for a meeting and pleaded their case. She refused to back down, however, and continued to push for more regulation of the derivatives. Then, in June 1998, Rubin went public to denounce her move, eventually recommending that Congress strip the CFTC of its regulatory authority. In 2000, on its last day in session, Congress passed the now-notorious Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which had been inserted into an 1l,000-page spending bill at the last minute, with almost no debate on the floor of the Senate. Banks were now free to trade default swaps with impunity.

    But the story didn't end there. AIG, a major purveyor of default swaps, approached the New York State Insurance Department in 2000 and asked whether default swaps would be regulated as insurance. At the time, the office was run by one Neil Levin, a former Goldman vice president, who decided against regulating the swaps. Now freed to underwrite as many housing-based securities and buy as much credit-default protection as it wanted, Goldman went berserk with lending lust. By the peak of the housing boom in 2006, Goldman was underwriting $76.5 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities - a third of which were subprime - much of it to institutional investors like pensions and insurance companies. And in these massive issues of real estate were vast swamps of crap.

    Take one $494 million issue that year, GSAMP Trust 2006-S3. Many of the mortgages belonged to second-mortgage borrowers, and the average equity they had in their homes was 0.71 percent. Moreover, 58 percent of the loans included little or no documentation - no names of the borrowers, no addresses of the homes, just zip codes. Yet both of the major ratings agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, rated 93 percent of the issue as investment grade. Moody's projected that less than 10 percent of the loans would default. In reality, 18 percent of the mortgages were in default within 18 months.

    Not that Goldman was personally at any risk. The bank might be taking all these hideous, completely irresponsible mortgages from beneath-gangster-status firms like Countrywide and selling them off to municipalities and pensioners - old people, for God's sake - pretending the whole time that it wasn't grade-D horseshit. But even as it was doing so, it was taking short positions in the same market, in essence betting against the same crap it was selling. Even worse, Goldman bragged about it in public. "The mortgage sector continues to be challenged," David Viniar, the bank's chief financial officer, boasted in 2007. "As a result, we took significant markdowns on our long inventory positions .... However, our risk bias in that market was to be short, and that net short position was profitable." In other words, the mortgages it was selling were for chumps. The real money was in betting against those same mortgages.

    "That's how audacious these assholes are," says one hedge-fund manager. "At least with other banks, you could say that they were just dumb - they believed what they were selling, and it blew them up. Goldman knew what it was doing." I ask the manager how it could be that selling something to customers that you're actually betting against - particularly when you know more about the weaknesses of those products than the customer - doesn't amount to securities fraud.

    "It's exactly securities fraud," he says. "It's the heart of securities fraud."

    Eventually, lots of aggrieved investors agreed. In a virtual repeat of the Internet IPO craze, Goldman was hit with a wave of lawsuits after the collapse of the housing bubble, many of which accused the bank of withholding pertinent information about the quality of the mortgages it issued. .... But once again, Goldman got off virtually scot-free, staving off prosecution by agreeing to pay a paltry $60 million - about what the bank's CDO division made in a day and a half during the real estate boom.

    The effects of the housing bubble are well known - it led more or less directly to the collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG, whose toxic portfolio of credit swaps was in significant part composed of the insurance that banks like Goldman bought against their own housing portfolios. In fact, at least $13 billion of the taxpayer money given to AIG in the bailout ultimately went to Goldman, meaning that the bank made out on the housing bubble twice: It hosed the investors who bought their horseshit CDOs by betting against its own crappy product, then it turned around and hosed the taxpayer by making him payoff those same bets.

    And once again, while the world was crashing down all around the bank, Goldman made sure it was doing just fine in the compensation department. In 2006, the firm's payroll jumped to $16.5 billion - an average of $622,000 per employee. As a Goldman spokesman explained, "We work very hard here."

    But the best was yet to come. While the collapse of the housing bubble sent most of the financial world fleeing for the exits, or to jail, Goldman boldly doubled down - and almost single-handedly created yet another bubble, one the world still barely knows the firm had anything to do with.

    BUBBLE #4 - $4 A GALLON
    By the beginning of 2008, the financial world was in turmoil. Wall Street had spent the past two and a half decades producing one scandal after another, which didn't leave much to sell that wasn't tainted. The terms junk bond, IPO, subprime mortgage and other once-hot financial fare were now firmly associated in the public's mind with scams; the terms credit swaps and CDOs were about to join them. The credit markets were in crisis, and the mantra that had sustained the fantasy economy throughout the Bush years - the notion that housing prices never go down - was now a fully exploded myth, leaving the Street clamoring for a new bullshit paradigm to sling.

    Where to go? With the public reluctant to put money in anything that felt like a paper investment, the Street quietly moved the casino to the physical-commodities market - stuff you could touch: corn, coffee, cocoa, wheat and, above all, energy commodities, especially oil. In conjunction with a decline in the dollar, the credit crunch and the housing crash caused a "flight to commodities." Oil futures in particular skyrocketed, as the price of a single barrel went from around $60 in the middle of 2007 to a high of $147 in the summer of 2008.

    That summer, as the presidential campaign heated up, the accepted explanation for why gasoline had hit $4.11 a gallon was that there was a problem with the world oil supply. In a classic example of how Republicans and Democrats respond to crises by engaging in fierce exchanges of moronic irrelevancies, John McCain insisted that ending the moratorium on offshore drilling would be "very helpful in the short term," while Barack Obama in typical liberal-arts yuppie style argued that federal investment in hybrid cars was the way out.

    GOLDMAN TURNED A SLEEPY OIL MARKET INTO A GIANT BETTING PARLOR - SPIKING PRICES AT THE PUMP.

    But it was all a lie. While the global supply of oil will eventually dry up, the short-term flow has actually been increasing. In the six months before prices spiked, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the world oil supply rose from 85.24 million barrels a day to 85.72 million. Over the same period, world oil demand dropped from 86.82 million barrels a day to 86.07 million. Not only was the short-term supply of oil rising, the demand for it was falling - which, in classic economic terms, should have brought prices at the pump down.

    So what caused the huge spike in oil prices? Take a wild guess. Obviously Goldman had help - there were other players in the physical-commodities market - but the root cause had almost everything to do with the behavior of a few powerful actors determined to turn the once-solid market into a speculative casino. Goldman did it by persuading pension funds and other large institutional investors to invest in oil futures - agreeing to buy oil at a certain price on a fixed date. The push transformed oil from a physical commodity, rigidly subject to supply and demand, into something to bet on, like a stock. Between 2003 and 2008, the amount of speculative money in commodities grew from $13 billion to $317 billion, an increase of 2,300 percent. By 2008, a barrel of oil was traded 27 times, on average, before it was actually delivered and consumed.

    As is so often the case, there had been a Depression-era law in place designed specifically to prevent this sort of thing. ... In 1936, Congress recognized that there should never be more speculators in the market than real producers and consumers. If that happened, prices would be affected by something other than supply and demand, and price manipulations would ensue. A new law empowered the Commodity Futures Trading Commission - the very same body that would later try and fail to regulate credit swaps - to place limits on speculative trades in commodities. As a result of the CFTC's oversight, peace and harmony reigned in the commodities markets for more than 50 years.

    All that changed in 1991 when, unbeknownst to almost everyone in the world, a Goldman-owned commodities-trading subsidiary called J. Aron wrote to the CFTC and made an unusual argument. Farmers with big stores of corn, Goldman argued, weren't the only ones who needed to hedge their risk against future price drops - Wall Street dealers who made big bets on oil prices also needed to hedge their risk, because, well, they stood to lose a lot too.

    This was complete and utter crap - the 1936 law, remember, was specifically designed to maintain distinctions between people who were buying and selling real tangible stuff and people who were trading in paper alone. But the CFTC, amazingly, bought Goldman's argument. It issued the bank a free pass, called the "Bona Fide Hedging" exemption, allowing Goldman's subsidiary to call itself a physical hedger and escape virtually all limits placed on speculators. In the years that followed, the commission would quietly issue 14 similar exemptions to other companies.

    Now Goldman and other banks were free to drive more investors into the commodities markets, enabling speculators to place increasingly big bets. That 1991 letter from Goldman more or less directly led to the oil bubble in 2008, when the number of speculators in the market - driven there by fear of the falling dollar and the housing crash - finally overwhelmed the real physical suppliers and consumers. By 2008, at least three quarters of the activity on the commodity exchanges was speculative, according to a congressional staffer who studied the numbers - and that's likely a conservative estimate. By the middle of last summer, despite rising supply and a drop in demand, we were paying $4 a gallon every time we pulled up to the pump.

    What is even more amazing is that the letter to Goldman, along with most of the other trading exemptions, was handed out more or less in secret. "I was the head of the division of trading and markets, and Brooksley Born was the chair of the CFTC," says Greenberger, "and neither of us knew this letter was out there." In fact, the letters only came to light by accident. Last year, a staffer for the House Energy and Commerce Committee just happened to be at a briefing when officials from the CFTC made an offhand reference to the exemptions.

    "1 had been invited to a briefing the commission was holding on energy," the staffer recounts. "And suddenly in the middle of it, they start saying, 'Yeah, we've been issuing these letters for years now.' I raised my hand and said, 'Really? You issued a letter? Can I see it?' And they were like, 'Duh, duh.' So we went back and forth, and finally they said, 'We have to clear it with Goldman Sachs.' I'm like, 'What do you mean, you have to clear it with Goldman Sachs?'" ... [I]n a classic example of how complete Goldman's capture of government is, the CFTC waited until it got clearance from the bank before it turned the letter over.

    Armed with the semi-secret government exemption, Goldman had become the chief designer of a giant commodities betting parlor. Its Goldman Sachs Commodities Index - which tracks the prices of 24 major commodities but is overwhelmingly weighted toward oil - became the place where pension funds and insurance companies and other institutional investors could make massive long-term bets on commodity prices. Which was all well and good, except for a couple of things. One was that index speculators are mostly "long only" bettors, who seldom if ever take short positions - meaning they only bet on prices to rise. While this kind of behavior is good for a stock market, it's terrible for commodities, because it continually forces prices upward. "If index speculators took short positions as well as long ones, you'd see them pushing prices both up and down," says Michael Masters, a hedge-fund manager who has helped expose the role of investment banks in the manipulation of oil prices. "But they only push prices in one direction: up."

    Complicating matters even further was the fact that Goldman itself was cheerleading with all its might for an increase in oil prices. In the beginning of 2008, Arjun Murti, a Goldman analyst, hailed as an "oracle of oil" by The New York Times, predicted a "super spike" in oil prices, forecasting a rise to $200 a barrel. At the time Goldman was heavily invested in oil through its commodities-trading subsidiary, J. Aron; it also owned a stake in a major oil refinery in Kansas, where it warehoused the crude it bought and sold. Even though the supply of oil was keeping pace with demand, Murti continually warned of disruptions to the world oil supply, going so far as to broadcast the fact that he owned two hybrid cars. High prices, the bank insisted, were somehow the fault of the piggish American consumer; in 2005, Goldman analysts insisted that we wouldn't know when oil prices would fall until we knew "when American consumers will stop buying gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles and instead seek fuel-efficient alternatives."

    But it wasn't the consumption of real oil that was driving up prices - it was the trade in paper oil. By the summer of2008, in fact, commodities speculators had bought and stockpiled enough oil futures to fill 1.1 billion barrels of crude, which meant that speculators owned more future oil on paper than there was real, physical oil stored in all of the country's commercial storage tanks and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve combined. It was a repeat of both the Internet craze and the housing bubble, when Wall Street jacked up present-day profits by selling suckers shares of a fictional fantasy future of endlessly rising prices.

    In what was by now a painfully familiar pattern, the oil-commodities melon hit the pavement hard in the summer of 2008, causing a massive loss of wealth; crude prices plunged from $147 to $33. Once again the big losers were ordinary people. The pensioners whose funds invested in this crap got massacred: CalPERS, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, had $1.1 billion in commodities when the crash came. And the damage didn't just come from oil. Soaring food prices driven by the commodities bubble led to catastrophes across the planet, forcing an estimated 100 million people into hunger and sparking food riots throughout the Third World. ...

    BUBBLE #5 - RIGGING THE BAILOUT
    After the oil bubble collapsed last fall, there was no new bubble to keep things humming - this time, the money seems to be really gone, like worldwide-depression gone. So the financial safari has moved elsewhere, and the big game in the hunt has become the only remaining pool of dumb, unguarded capital left to feed upon: taxpayer money. Here, in the biggest bailout in history, is where Goldman Sachs really started to flex its muscle.

    It began in September of last year, when then-Treasury secretary Paulson made a momentous series of decisions. Although he had already engineered a rescue of Bear Stearns a few months before and helped bail out quasi-private lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Paulson elected to let Lehman Brothers - one of Goldman's last real competitors - collapse without intervention. ("Goldman's superhero status was left intact," says market analyst Eric Salzman, "and an investment-banking competitor, Lehman, goes away.") The very next day, Paulson greenlighted a massive, $85 billion bailout of AIG, which promptly turned around and repaid $13 billion it owed to Goldman. Thanks to the rescue effort, the bank ended up getting paid in full for its bad bets: By contrast, retired auto workers awaiting the Chrysler bailout will be lucky to receive 50 cents for every dollar they are owed.

    Immediately after the AIG bailout, Paulson announced his federal bailout for the financial industry, a $700 billion plan called the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and put a heretofore unknown 35-year-old Goldman banker named Neel Kashkari in charge of administering the funds. In order to qualify for bailout monies, Goldman announced that it would convert from an investment bank to a bankholding company, a move that allows it access not only to $10 billion in TARP funds, but to a whole galaxy of less conspicuous, publicly backed funding - most notably, lending from the discount window of the Federal Reserve. By the end of March, the Fed will have lent or guaranteed at least $8.7 trillion under a series of new bailout programs - and thanks to an obscure law allowing the Fed to block most congressional audits, both the amounts and the recipients of the monies remain almost entirely secret.

    Converting to a bank-holding company has other benefits as well: Goldman's primary supervisor is now the New York Fed, whose chairman at the time of its announcement was Stephen Friedman, a former co-chairman of Goldman Sachs. Friedman was technically in violation of Federal Reserve policy by remaining on the board of Goldman even as he was supposedly regulating the bank; in order to rectify the problem, he applied for, and got, a conflict-of-interest waiver from the government. Friedman was also supposed to divest himself of his Goldman stock after Goldman became a bank-holding company, but thanks to the waiver, he was allowed to go out and buy 52,000 additional shares in his old bank, leaving him $3 million richer. Friedman stepped down in May, but the man now in charge of supervising Goldman - New York Fed president William Dudley - is yet another former Goldmanite.

    The collective message of all this - the AIG bailout, the swift approval for its bank-holding conversion, the TARP funds - is that when it comes to Goldman Sachs, there isn't a free market at all. The government might let other players on the market die, but it simply will not allow Goldman to fail under any circumstances. Its edge in the market has suddenly become an open declaration of supreme privilege. "In the past it was an implicit advantage," says Simon Johnson, an economics professor at MIT and former official at the International Monetary Fund, who compares the bailout to the crony capitalism he has seen in Third World countries. "Now it's more of an explicit advantage." ...

    And here's the real punch line. After playing an intimate role in four historic bubble catastrophes, after helping $5 trillion in wealth disappear from the NASDAQ, after pawning off thousands of toxic mortgages on pensioners and cities, after helping to drive the price of gas up to $4 a gallon and to push 100 million people around the world into hunger, after securing tens of billions of taxpayer dollars through a series of bailouts overseen by its former CEO, what did Goldman Sachs give back to the people of the United States in 2008?

    Fourteen million dollars.

    That is what the firm paid in taxes in 2008, an effective tax rate of exactly one, read it, one percent. The bank paid out $10 billion in compensation and benefits that same year and made a profit of more than $2 billion - yet it paid the Treasury less than a third of what it forked over to CEO Lloyd Blankfein, who made $42.9 million last year.

    How is this possible? According to Goldman's annual report, the low taxes are due in large part to changes in the bank's "geographic earnings mix." In other words, the bank moved its money around so that most of its earnings took place in foreign countries with low tax rates. Thanks to our completely hosed corporate tax system, companies like Goldman can ship their revenues offshore and defer taxes on those revenues indefinitely, even while they claim deductions upfront on that same untaxed income. This is why any corporation with an at least occasionally sober accountant can usually find a way to zero out its taxes. A GAO report, in fact, found that between 1998 and 2005, roughly two-thirds of all corporations operating in the U.S. paid no taxes at all.

    This should be a pitchfork-level outrage - but somehow, when Goldman released its post-bailout tax profile, hardly anyone said a word. One of the few to remark on the obscenity was Rep. Lloyd Doggett, a Democrat from Texas who serves on the House Ways and Means Committee. "With the right hand out begging for bailout money," he said, "the left is hiding it offshore."

    BUBBLE #6 - GLOBAL WARMING
    Fast-Forward to today. It's early June in Washington, D.C. Barack Obama, a popular young politician whose leading private campaign donor was an investment bank called Goldman Sachs - its employees paid some $981,000 to his campaign - sits in the White House. Having seamlessly navigated the political minefield of the bailout era, Goldman is once again back to its old business, scouting out loopholes in a new government-created market with the aid of a new set of alumni occupying key government jobs.

    AS ENVISIONED BY GOLDMAN, THE FIGHT TO STOP GLOBAL WARMING WILL BECOME A "CARBON MARKET" WORTH $1 TRILLION A YEAR.

    Gone are Hank Paulson and Neel Kashkari; in their place are Treasury chief of staff Mark Patterson and CFTC chief Gary Gensler, both former Goldmanites. (Gensler was the firm's co-head of finance) And instead of credit derivatives or oil futures or mortgage-backed CDOs, the new game in town, the next bubble, is in carbon credits - a booming trillion-dollar market that barely even exists yet, but will if the Democratic Party that it gave $4,452,585 to in the last election manages to push into existence a groundbreaking new commodities bubble, disguised as an "environmental plan," called cap-and-trade.

    The new carbon-credit market is a virtual repeat of the commodities-market casino that's been kind to Goldman, except it has one delicious new wrinkle: If the plan goes forward as expected, the rise in prices will be government-mandated. Goldman won't even have to rig the game. It will be rigged in advance.

    Here's how it works: If the bill passes; there will be limits for coal plants, utilities, natural-gas distributors and numerous other industries on the amount of carbon emissions (a.k.a. greenhouse gases) they can produce per year. If the companies go over their allotment, they will be able to buy "allocations" or credits from other companies that have managed to produce fewer emissions. President Obama conservatively estimates that about $646 billions worth of carbon credits will be auctioned in the first seven years; one of his top economic aides speculates that the real number might be twice or even three times that amount.

    The feature of this plan that has special appeal to speculators is that the "cap" on carbon will be continually lowered by the government, which means that carbon credits will become more and more scarce with each passing year. Which means that this is a brand-new commodities market where the main commodity to be traded is guaranteed to rise in price over time. The volume of this new market will be upwards of a trillion dollars annually; for comparison's sake, the annual combined revenues of an electricity suppliers in the U.S. total $320 billion.

    Goldman wants this bill. The plan is (1) to get in on the ground floor of paradigm-shifting legislation, (2) make sure that they're the profit-making slice of that paradigm and (3) make sure the slice is a big slice. Goldman started pushing hard for cap-and-trade long ago, but things really ramped up last year when the firm spent $3.5 million to lobby climate issues. (One of their lobbyists at the time was none other than Patterson, now Treasury chief of staff.) Back in 2005, when Hank Paulson was chief of Goldman, he personally helped author the bank's environmental policy, a document that contains some surprising elements for a firm that in all other areas has been consistently opposed to any sort of government regulation. Paulson's report argued that "voluntary action alone cannot solve the climate-change problem." A few years later, the bank's carbon chief, Ken Newcombe, insisted that cap-and-trade alone won't be enough to fix the climate problem and called for further public investments in research and development. Which is convenient, considering that 'Goldman made early investments in wind power (it bought a subsidiary called Horizon Wind Energy), renewable diesel (it is an investor in a firm called Changing World Technologies) and solar power (it partnered with BP Solar), exactly the kind of deals that will prosper if the government forces energy producers to use cleaner energy. As Paulson said at the time, "We're not making those investments to lose money."

    The bank owns a 10 percent stake in the Chicago Climate Exchange, where the carbon credits will be traded. Moreover, Goldman owns a minority stake in Blue Source LLC, a Utah-based firm that sells carbon credits of the type that will be in great demand if the bill passes. Nobel Prize winner Al Gore, who is intimately involved with the planning of cap-and-trade, started up a company called Generation Investment Management with three former bigwigs from Goldman Sachs Asset Management, David Blood, Mark Ferguson and Peter Harris. Their business? Investing in carbon offsets. There's also a $500 million Green Growth Fund set up by a Goldmanite to invest in green-tech ... the list goes on and on. Goldman is ahead of the headlines again, just waiting for someone to make it rain in the right spot. Will this market be bigger than the energy-futures market?

    "Oh, it'll dwarf it," says a former staffer on the House energy committee. ....

    "If it's going to be a tax, I would prefer that Washington set the tax and collect it," says Michael Masters, the hedge fund director who spoke out against oil-futures speculation. "But we're saying that Wall Street can set the tax, and Wall Street can collect the tax. That's the last thing in the world I want. It's just asinine."

    Cap-and-trade is going to happen. Or, if it doesn't, something like it will. The moral is the same as for all the other bubbles that Goldman helped create, from 1929 to 2009. In almost every case, the very same bank that behaved recklessly for years, weighing down the system with toxic loans and predatory debt, and accomplishing nothing but massive bonuses for a few bosses, has been rewarded with mountains of virtually free money and government guarantees - while the actual victims in this mess, ordinary taxpayers, are the ones paying for it.

    It's not always easy to accept the reality of what we now routinely allow these people to get away with; there's a kind of collective denial that kicks in when a country goes through what America has gone through lately, when a people lose as much prestige and status as we have in the past few years. You can't really register the fact that you're no longer a citizen of a thriving first-world democracy, that you're no longer above getting robbed in broad daylight, because like an amputee, you can still sort of feel things that are no longer there.

    But this is it. This is the world we live in now. And in this world, some of us have to play by the rules, while others get a note from the principal excusing them from homework till the end of time, plus 10 billion free dollars in a paper bag to buy lunch. It's a gangster state, running on gangster economics, and even prices can't be trusted anymore; there are hidden taxes in every buck you pay. And maybe we can't stop it, but we should at least know where it's all going.

The bubbles don't come 'til the end of the program... Turn off the bubbles... Turn off the bubble machine!

kao, kao, kao, 破plan，写这个鸟东西真是比挤牙膏还难受！！！

中午做的鸡味道不错，看来炒之前还是得用开水烫一下

央视的这个公益广告8错，最后这个镜头很有意境，可惜找不到清晰图

郭靜Claire-我不想忘記你
  

piss on my parade
The art of putting a dampener on someones moment of glory/celebration. Interchangeable with the phrase "You rained on my parade."
eg:
Person A: I got 3As in my exams! Awesome!
Person B: I got 7As.
Person A: Way to piss on my parade, bastard.

估计不是真的，也就是网上恶搞的，画的挺逗

 群众都喜欢阴谋论

电影和动画剧情不同了~

有一个问题困扰了我足足二十年：为什么汽车人要帮地球人？光用“所有有感知的生物
都应享有自由”这个法则是根本说不过去的，因为猪也有感知，但人类就把猪圈养起来
，随意杀戮。从这个角度来讲，如果汽车人绝对坚持“自由法则”的话，应该把人类当
作霸天虎一样的邪恶生命体加以消灭才对，为何要帮地球人奴役其他生物呢？

直到昨天下午看完《变二》，终于大彻大悟。 原因有两个：
第一，人类够强。
第二，堕落金刚存在。

有理由相信汽车人和霸天虎在几百年之前都是堕落金刚的马仔，任务是在宇宙中搜寻更
多的能量，但擎天柱这个傻面贼心的家伙和威震天这个野心勃勃的痴呆，肯定都不愿意
久居人下。要干翻大佬自己上位，就必须获取能量，还不能让堕落金刚发现。

他们找到了地球。

十九世纪的地球人还很弱，凭变形金刚的能力可以轻易摧毁这个星球上的抵抗力量，进
而摧毁太阳获取能量。但这样一来，大部分能量都会被堕落金刚夺走，毕竟它是大佬。
“装死”计划启动，在擎天柱这个一代奸雄的授意下，威震天假装跌到了极地冰原中，
我相信擎天柱是这么说的：“兄弟，尽管去装死吧，我们后面几十把家伙招呼着呢！”
这是一项走钢丝的计划，很危险，但果然取得了成功——堕落金刚并没有得到想要的能
量，而人类也利用变形金刚的技术发展起来。注意，擎天柱等人并不是那么好心帮助人
类，帮助人类的目的很简单——有朝一日帮他们干翻堕落金刚。

一百多年过去了……

擎天柱等人猛然发现有些不对，人类的成长速度太快了啊，这样下去固然能够干翻堕落
金刚，但一个不小心连自己都可以干翻，那岂非得不偿失？看看人类的技术，光凭美军
的一支特种部队，肯定不到一个团的规模，就能干倒几十台原生霸天虎，这要是集结所
有美军、俄军、解放军，再动用核武器……变形金刚还有戏吗？强行进攻，肯定不行。
只有想办法打入敌人内部。计划是简单直接的——霸天虎扮恶人，来地球上烧杀抢掠无
恶不作引起恐慌。随后，“救世主”汽车人降临，扮英雄，一次又一次打败了霸天虎。
我们知道，变形金刚这个东西虽然看起来很大只，但它其实是很脆弱的，需要消耗大量
能源、零件和弹药补给，而面对非我族类的异种外星生物，人类肯定是战到最后一兵一
卒。但现在呢，人类自愿开放了所有资源，共享所有资讯，甚至将最高机密都泄露给了
这些外星人。够了，时机已经成熟了，堕落金刚的时代已经过去，轮到我们两兄弟纵横
四方了！

决心：必杀堕落金刚！

整个诱敌深入、螳螂捕蝉的计划，大家可以自己去看电影，这里不细说，只说说结果。

在《变形金刚第一集》之前的年代里，情况是这样：

变形金刚整体在宇宙中缺乏能量，四处流浪，一盘散沙，威震天是一个马仔头目，而擎
天柱虽然看上去是领袖，但手下也缺兵少将，大部分汽车人都不鸟它，而是在各个星球
悠哉游哉，逍遥自在。

《变形金刚第二集》落幕之后，经过一番运作，现在的情况是：

威震天的老板被干掉，自己上位当了话事人，掌控霸天虎的所有资源，包括一个近地轨
道上特别牛叉，有若异形巢穴的基地。擎天柱养贼自重，不断召唤各个星球的汽车人前
来，“地球人傻、能量多、速来”，实力进一步壮大，还进一步获取了人类的信任，在
人类的帮助下建立了一个又一个基地，获取了稳定的能量和弹药补给来源。此外，还发
现了人类的终极武器：磁轨炮。这里涉及到另一个问题：大力神是干啥子的？如果说这
个大家伙组装起来就是为了拆拆金字塔，那未免太侮辱变形金刚的智商。它被创造的目
的，是为了挨一炮。没错，就是为了被地球人最先进的秘密武器磁轨炮，轰上一炮。我
相信擎天柱一直知道人类有这么一种牛叉武器的存在，这种武器可以给变形金刚造成绝
大的伤害，因此在暴露真面目之前，它必须搞清楚这种武器的真正威力和运作模式。最
简单的调查方式，就是让人类使用这种武器。整个“金字塔攻略战”的两大目标，消灭
堕落天使，暴露人类最先进武器，全都达到了。大力神虽然被轰杀，但临死前肯定已经
记录了磁轨炮的全部数据，经过分析研究之后，变形金刚肯定也能掌握这种武器——我
们看到，变形金刚现在的武器系统之落后，光是杀一个山姆，就杀了两集将近五个小时
还没干掉，效率太过低下，但装备了磁轨炮之后就不同了，那将是一支无敌铁军。

至此，整个“金字塔攻略战”的战略意图已经完全达到，擎天柱和威震天两个难兄难弟
，现在已经真正成为了各自集团中独一无二的强横元首，相信用不了两年他们就会集结
各自的兵力大举侵略地球，至于两人之间的第二次内战，恐怕要等人类被灭绝之后才会
开始。

人类……灭亡似乎是不可避免了。

但……

黑暗中，人类还有一支秘密的科技力量并没有被变形金刚发现。现在，那支力量被禁闭
在一台超级计算机内，这台计算机的名字叫做“天网”。 尽管约翰•康纳曾经警
告美国军方不要继续研究天网技术，但军方中少数有识之士却明白，这可能是人类最后
的希望，正所谓饮鸩止渴，顾不上那么许多了。

两年之后，二零一一，《变形金刚3 天网反击战》，T800VS擎天柱，谁将被终结？

　 补充一点证据：

片中出现过一个诱惑山姆的人形机械体，后来图穷匕见准备干掉山姆，却被山姆的女友
用车子撞碎了，大家应该记得吧？ 这个女机械人还被大黄蜂调戏过，喷了一脸黄油，
还在座位上砸了两下。我看到有个网友问：大黄蜂怎么可能没感知到这是个霸天虎呢？
当然，如果她是个霸天虎的话，大黄蜂肯定会感知到的——但事实上，她的确不是霸
天虎啊！我相信，这个女性人形机械体，不是所谓的隐者战士，而应该是一台T-X。它
来自未来，来自那个变形金刚已经大举侵略地球，人类依靠天网苦苦支撑的时空。它的
任务是杀死山姆。因为山姆一死，能源宝的秘密就无人知晓，而大野心家擎天柱后面一
系列的阴谋都不可能得逞，金字塔攻略战也不可能展开，那么就算到时候变形金刚入侵
地球，人类也肯定能获得胜利。但是很可惜，这台T-X没有完成任务，历史的车轮还在
不停转动，暴雨将至，人类的未来还是要靠自己创造啊。 ~~~~

要写2个破plan，每到这时候就要狂哭自个儿e文烂，写那么2句就写不下去了，唉唉唉唉唉唉唉!!! 不过倒是个锻炼

"楼脆脆“， 哈哈哈

kick the tires and light the fires
(US) (used by fighter pilots) To take off.
Etymology: From kick the tires, referring to a preflight check of the landing gear+ light the fires, referring to the ignition of the afterburners, a part of the engine which burns extra fuel for a speed boost during takeoff.

1.中国建设银行——CBC（Construction  Bank  of  China）——“存不存？”
2.中国银行——BC（Bank of China）——“不存

3.中国农业银行——ABC（Agriculture Bank of China）——“啊，不存。”

4.中国工商银行——ICBC——“爱存不存。”
5.民生银行——CMSB——“存吗？傻比”

6.招商银行——CMBC——“存吗？白痴！”
7.兴业银行——CIB——“存一百”

8.国家开发银行——CDB——“存点吧！”

9.“北京市商业银行——BCCB——“白存存不？”
10。汇丰银行——HSBC——“还是不存。”

早上开会老板说前一段大家太辛苦了，欧洲农民都有two extra days off，那我们都有吧，算是对overtime的补偿，kaka，赞

一人之辩，重于九鼎之宝；三寸之舌，强于百万雄师。

Sunshine Cleaning, love it, amy adams鼻梁真高

peter out: to come gradually to an end
eg: the road petered out into a rutted track

这文章跟前一天贴的一篇异曲同工

2009年06月27日  来源： 中国经营报

　　“四大”进入中国后，通过各类公关活动，与中国相关政府部门保持良好关系。特别是通过与政府合作方式，把自己和监管部门紧密联系在一起。

　　德勤从1993年开始，就作为项目顾问参与财政部制定中国会计准则，此后长期协助财政部推进此发展方案。此外，德勤还与国家税务总局、国资委等政府部门有着密切的合作。中国注册会计师协会还聘请“四大”会计师事务所起草《风险导向审计程序》，以此“构建更完善的政策制度”。

　　自1995年起，毕马威上海首席合伙人萧伟强就担任中国会计审计准则外国专家顾问，安永的中国区合伙人邱家赐担任证监会发审委委员。由于和政府部门关系密切，“四大”在华受到的监管很少，因此可以便利地谋取更多更广泛的利益。

　　诸多国家和地区都制定相关措施限制外资会计师事务所于境内展业，如我国台湾对外资会计师事务所进行较为严格的限制，外资事务所的会计师必须考取当地的资格后才能执业。印度除此以外还要求外资事务所做上市公司业务后须经本土事务所复核。日本、韩国等国家也对本地的会计师事务所采取保护措施。

　　而像中国这样多个政府部门与一个始终对中国不很友善国家的机构保持如此密切关系、并使其享受多种“特许经营”，在国际上是罕见的。或许正是因为这种罕见的关系，使中国监管部门宁愿牺牲本国机构的利益，来讨好满足这一特殊群体的需要。正是在中国相关监管部门的帮助下，“四大”几乎垄断了中国大企业，尤其是金融企业、跨国企业的审计业务。“四大”也因为这种“特许经营”而获取高额垄断收益。

　　研究显示，同一个审计项目，“四大”的收费高出国内所2～5倍很正常。以收费标准最高的北京为例，国内所的主任、副主任会计师每小时收费300 元，而安永为2750元。随着审计事务所并购加速，行业集中度会越来越高，“四大”的优势将越来越明显，获取的垄断利润也会越来越大。

　　跨国垄断资本的本性是获取暴利与实施控制。控制是为了更好、更稳定地获取暴利，而暴利则更便利、更有条件实施控制。在华垄断地位不断强化的“四大”不只是获取丰厚的市场利润，而且是获取更具有战略性的资源——信息。“四大”审计的大型企业特别是金融类企业，关系着中国经济命脉。这些企业完全由“ 四大”来审计，无疑将中国经济的重要数据暴露给了外资。据中国银行一经理人员透露，在中行上市审计期间，中行高层专门指示各部门必须为普华永道提供一切可以提供的资料，而很多资料本来对自己的研究人员都实行保密。

　　不仅如此，还由“四大”来设计企业改革、融资模式，如普华永道为中国工商银行规划了未来8年的公司治理机制和全面风险管理改革路线图，这意味着企业的核心竞争力和弱点毫无保留地展现给了外资。

　　近年来，中国“走出去”的企业屡屡遭遇不顺，巨额经济损失时有发生，相关专业人士认为，一方面是因为我们缺乏经验；另一方面，恐怕也是最重要方面，就是我们的企业已经无商业秘密可保。外资审计、评级、咨询、承销，还有战略投资、管理顾问等，已经使中国企业乃至部分政府部门在近乎透明的状态下运作。

　　早在2002年初，也就是中国证监会颁布那“一纸文书”后不久，著名经济学家董辅先生就撰文指出了“必须请外国公司补充审计”这一规定的荒谬。7年多过去了，董先生也已作古，相关监管部门非但不迷途知返，反而变本加厉，使外资审计机构对华审计行业的控制日甚一日。

　　2006年以来，中国股市如脱缰野马，狂奔不止，急速膨胀的风险日益令人不安。有业内人士指出，这相当一部分归于“会计革新”，即上市公司可以合法交叉持股，拉抬股价。本人不甚清晰这是哪家机构使出的“高招儿”，也不清楚监管者为什么会接受这一“妙计”，但我知道的是，当初日本就是因为允许企业交叉持股而使股市迅速走向泡沫，而随着泡沫的破灭，到来的是十多年的经济萧条。本人不敢猜测这其中是否有什么人的预谋，但可以设想，这极有可能使中国股市走向危局。

　　（作者为中国现代国际关系研究院经济安全研究中心主任）

周六看的还有新航$599到HK的，今儿就变$1200了，逼我飞北京啊。。。

热的无心工作。。。

突然想到我想到小时候也是大热的天，要在外面顶着大太阳赶路，ironic，isn't it?

晚上居然很凉快。。。

beyond -- 逝去日子
   

不查，都是孔繁森；一查，都是王宝森！
不查，都是马英九；一查，都是陈水扁！
不查，问题都在前三排；一查，根子全在主席台。
不查，个个人模狗样；一查，全都男盗女娼。
不查，都是贞德；一查，都是婊子。
不查，每人都戴三块普通表；一查，家里至少养着3个婊子。
不查，学习心得个个发自肺腑；一查，原来全部来自百度。
不查，处处鲜花；一查，原来都是豆腐渣。
不查，都是平民奋斗成功史；一查，都是官员拐弯抹角的七大姑八大姨。
不查，都在为革命辛勤站岗；一查，原来人家早已怀揣绿卡
不查，都要为人民服务；一查，全都在被人民服务。
不查，是天灾；一查，是人祸。
不查，都是中国人；一查，都是外国籍。
不查，都是代表；一查，全是领导。
不查，多难兴邦；一查，多盖房子发家。
不查，是三块表；一查，是三座山。
不查，全是优越性；一查，都是性优越。
不查，是野三关；一查，是黑风镇。
不查，他是公仆；一查，原来他更喜欢女仆。
不查，是人民的儿子；一查，是人民的罪犯。
不查，是修脚刀；一查，就成了水果刀。
不查，人人都学红宝书；一查，人人怀揣小绿卡。
不查，人人都坚挺；一查，个个疲软。
不查，都是领导的脑子，一查，全是秘书的稿子。

续：
不查，个个巴菲特；一查，全都扒光勒
不查，个个赛潘安；一查，全都成奎安
不查，个个奥巴马；一查，全都奥马尔
不查，个个赵子龙；一查，全都赵本山
不查，个个俏黄蓉；一查，全都真芙蓉
不查，个个姚明；一查，全都要命
不查，个个刘翔；一查，全都投降

今日避暑记：
图书馆今儿关门，于是今儿去barnes & nobles, 不得不说good choice。
看了5本书:
-101 best trails in bay area，这本书不错，看了以后发现上面写的n多trail自己只去过2条，汗

-florida旅游，想今年thxgiving的时候去southwest parks兜一圈，如果去不了就去FL吧，刚好上次还拿到一张universal studio的免费票，看了看行程orlando -> miami -> key west，说不定还能回NC看看

-blackwater，翻了几十页，没什么大意思，适合"爱国"的美国人看

-waterlily全收录，这本书很惊艳，$50，贵了点，不然就抱回家了

-grammar, damn, 真复杂，一个动词前后左右来回能变出20种形式，还有n多exceptions，靠，还是中文好啊，完全没有时态变化，没有阴性阳性，名词复数都没有，除了难写点儿，难念点儿。

barnes & nobles周末人真多啊，nnd，下午都没有座位了，只好坐地上看书，中间看到一饿小孩很可爱。书店还放了n多michael jackson的歌，俺不是big fan，只知道一首beat it。

今天终于知道原来公司名字后面的S.A.是啥意思了：Société anonyme

今日避暑：昨儿看到今天说95度，今儿一大早就出去去图书馆了，果然凉爽啊，中午出来去carl‘s jr，太阳晒在身上生疼，geeez，下午又坐了一下午，人家关门给赶出来了，唉，才6点，太阳还大着呢，重新跑到carl’s jr坐了一个小时，nnd，怀疑那家店空调有问题，很热。等到7点多就没那么热了，回家，还出去了work out了一下，感觉不错，晚上还是挺了快的，回到家9点多了，屋里还是很热，要到11点以后才凉快

今天在别人的blog上看到的潘婷广告，最后那个蝴蝶破茧而出太exciting了
     

一个joke, haha:
黄忠那么厉害，为什么年轻的时候没有出名？

把五虎将和吕布关在一个笼子里，谁能站到最后？

不分敌我，我们来分析一下。六个人站好，捉对厮杀。假设是肉搏，没马，没兵器。假设六个人彼此都不认识，但对彼此实力有粗浅了解。
　　
关羽最自大，挑衅性也最高，所以肯定第一个动手，而且必然去挑吕布，吕布虽然并不好战，但也不是吃素人，这俩开始掐。

张飞最浑不吝，没有尊重老年人的思想包袱，而且他看不上小白脸儿，所以肯定找黄忠掐，黄只好迎战。

剩下马超，来挑赵云。马超身体素质较佳，但赵云灵巧性及智慧占优。

一柱香之后，身为老年人的黄忠体力不支，精力不济，首先倒在张飞罪恶的双手下。

此时马赵二人还在互相试探阶段，关吕二人已是全力相搏，目前不分高下。

发了狂性的张飞必然来参与关吕一组，由于其对关羽的红脸有天生的好感，而且对吕布有抑制不住的厌恶，故必然伙同关羽来掐吕布。

一柱香后，内心不断喊冤的吕布终于倒在关张二人罪恶而发达的四肢下。

此时，马赵二人已开始真掐一段时间，由于是贴身肉搏，马超略占上风。

关羽不屑于参与别人的掐架，又觉得张飞是个对手，故摆出邀战姿态，张飞毫不犹豫就来应战，二人全力相搏。

两柱香后，由于张飞最开始的对手黄忠较弱，故体力消耗不大，而关羽自始至终都是全力和吕布角力，体力透支严重，终于倒在张飞罪恶的魔爪之下。

此时赵云已呈败势，但他不会像关羽一样死撑，故采取游斗方式，并尽量保存体力。

只剩下百分之十体力的张飞仍然不会闲着，身为直性子人的他看不过赵云边打边走，故帮助马超把小赵堵在犄角。

一炷香后，心里把张飞的娘操了八百多遍的赵云终于倒在了马张二人罪恶滔天的黑手下。

马张掐开始！

二人肉搏本来张飞应该略占上风，但由于张飞开始不间断地拚了其他几个人，而且不惜力，故此时体力及不上刚才只和游斗状态的赵云较量过的马超，就算张飞的狠劲在六人里无出其右，身为西北苦寒之地彪悍民族代言人的马超也不会输他多少。

一炷香之后，手上沾满了黄吕关赵四人鲜血的罪恶张飞终于倒在了西凉小伙儿马孟起的玉掌之下！！！

已经精疲力尽的马超摇摇晃晃地跪倒在地，脸上浮现出游离式的笑容，面对老天，长出一口气。

这时，一直躺在地上装死并暗中休息的黄忠站起身来，大步上前，将马小伙喉咙一把锁紧，轻松捏死。嘿嘿。

picking up nickels in front of a steamroller

moment of truth
1. Definition:
(n.) climax; time when something will either fail or succeed
Examples:
I’ve been practicing for months, but here comes the moment of truth.

昨儿晚上1点半才睡，今儿早上就困的不行了

roofing没完没了了，整了一周了还没有完的迹象，明天好热，一大早就躲到sj lib去；今天下午终于等来了cable guy，把cable弄好了

ICBC, 爱存不存，哈哈

这次限制稀土出口的仗一定要赢啊！！

中国核心信息的被掠夺

1、各种掠夺信息的手段
A、我们的送货上门

我们记得一个流传得非常广的故事，说日本为了分析中国在东北大庆是否发现了大油田，油田储量有多少，仔细地分析了我们《红旗》杂志上的报道，对于铁人王进喜的照片上楼梯扶手的粗细进行了仔细的分析和运算，从而得到了中国油田的真实信息，这样的故事当时我们是把它当作中国的信息情报的流失的反面教材的！

但是我们现在的情况发生了根本的改变，我们就还是按照上面的故事再演绎一下，现在的故事是这样讲的：

中国在西方的诱饵下，自己主动的把所有的数据交给了西方世界，这样还不够，人家要问你：你的数据真实吗？这时中国人就拿出了《红旗》杂志的照片，根据照片上扶手的粗细自己列出算式仔细运算后告诉对方，我们是有证据证明这些数据是真实的。现在中国的海外投资、招商引资等等就是陷入这样核心信息流失的境地。下面各节我们将仔细地分析一下具体的情况。
B、中国企业的海外上市

中国的海外上市不仅仅是中国的一般企业，中国的战略核心企业也加入了海外上市之旅，这些核心企业的海外上市，尤其是所有的垄断行业的核心企业的海外上市，将导致关系国家命脉的行业的整体信息被外国掌握。

我们的中国石油、中国石化和中海油污无一例外的在海外上市，三大石油公司海外上市，使得国外掌握了中国整个石油业的信息。

我们的中国电信、中国网通、中国联通和中国移动四大电信企业都是海外上市公司，这几大电信企业海外上市使得国际上对于中国的整个电信业的信息也披露无疑。

而中国银行、建设银行、工商银行等已经在海外上市，农业银行正在积极地争取上市，很多中小银行也是海外上市银行，这些银行尤其是几大国有银行海外上市，使世界对于中国的金融信息完全掌控。

在交通领域，中国远洋、中海发展、招商局等等也是海外上市的公司，中国的国航、东航也在上市之列，中国的航空、航运公司海外上市，境外对于中国的交通运输信息也是全部的泄漏。

中国的门户互联网几乎全部是海外上市，他们的上市还有意的规避了中国的法律，因为中国的互联网领域限制外资持股，他们是以离岸技术公司的身份在海外上市，然后通过技术公司与国内的同名同商标的网络公司签署技术服务和商标域名使用授权，通过“奴隶”协议的方式把利润转移到海外，而境内外公司的实际控制人是相同的。所以我们的互联网信息实际上是对外透明的，海外的技术公司好像只是技术，但是他们要就其服务的网络公司进行信息挖掘，是轻而易举的事情。

中国的电信、金融、石油、航空航运、网络等等最重要的行业，应当保密的，现在在上市的过程中不但要告诉他们企业的全部信息，还要自己提供证据证明所说的是真的。上节所演绎的故事就是这样的发生了。

我们的海外上市，不仅仅是上市公告的那些信息，也不是每年年报的信息，这里有他们能够取得非公开信息的渠道。对于华尔街的投资银行，全球的主要企业都让他们辅导上市，我们的上市公司也不例外，结果就是全部的信息被他们掌握，中国的核心信息流失。在辅导的过程和上市的过程中，你必须给他们真实的信息他们才可以辅导你，同时他们以要当你保荐人的责任问题，一定要求你对于你所提供的信息的真实性的证明，而只要海外上市了，每年的年报的审计也是境外四大会计师事务所的工作，在审计的时候所有审计师关心的财务数据你也要给他们证明，包括你的各种交易、采购、销售、生产成本等等数据，都在境外事务所的审计师的审计范围，这就是你必须给人家你的核心信息，还要给人家证据自己证明你的信息的真实，中国主要行业的大多数核心企业进行了海外的上市工作，那么这些企业给他们提供的信息就再次产生更大的利益，对方就可以汇总这些信息绘制出你整个行业乃至整个国家的经济蓝图，国家的核心信息就流失了。
C、中国的风投活动

我们的境外风险投资在中国的活动是风风火火，他们给出的天价融资让所有的中国创业者趋之若鹜，风投公司成为了他们的上帝，一切的信息都向风投公司公开。

而风险投资不仅仅需要了解企业的情况，还要了解企业所处的市场、企业创业者的人脉，想要获得投资的企业都把这些信息尽可能的告诉VC，同时把经营的智慧和思路告诉他们。VC会接触所有行业内想要融资的企业，而中国行业内资金奇缺，都有此需求，导致信息制高点被VC占据。想要创业找风险投资公司融资的人都是中国的精英，掌握所在行业的核心信息资源，他们的信息全部被少数垄断的国际风险投资公司套取，中国的各行各业的核心信息就全部被风险投资公司所掌握。

然后得到风投公司投资的创业者就如同彩票中奖了一样，只有极少数的创业者可以得到风投的青睐，同时这些幸运儿被包装成为天才，因为在资本市场上资产的价值、市场的价值、技术的价值都可以评估，而天才是不能评估的无价的东西，可以任意发挥人的想象，最具备在资本市场炒作的价值。

而这些天才们的想法，更多的是来自于风投们从其他创业者那里套取的创业思路，然后让他们的“天才”们去执行，你是无法以保密协议约束他们的，因为你可以想到的想法他们的“天才”理所当然的能够“想到”。VC可以以大家不能想象的高估值去投资一个公司的背后，是他们了解了全行业，还可以利用全行业的智慧和思路，这些思路就是他们从全行业想要他们投资的企业向他们咨询和融资谈判时套取的。

所以以本人从事多年的投资融资的工作经验，告诉未来的创业者：如果你自己的企业没有发展到一定程度形成行业门槛，找风险投资是给他们白白提供思路；如果风险投资已经投资了类似的企业，更要小心自己的融资行为会向你的竞争对手泄密！创业者应当记住你只是一个乌鸦，你嘴里的奶酪就是你的想法和你所掌握的行业信息，而风投们都是在这个行业里面混了多少年的狐狸，他们会唱着赞歌让你开口，但是一旦你开口了，他们得到你奶酪后，就会离你而去，你是得不到融资的。很多融资的传奇只能当作故事听！而创业的起始需要的是天使投资，这样的投资是要靠天使眷顾的。
D、中国的招商引资

中国的对外的招商引资长期以来是非常艰巨的政治任务，各个地方政府也经常以招商金额作为官员政绩的一项重要的考核指标，而我们的招商引资的背后，就是我们的中方企业的核心信息被外方套取。

在这里我们可以看到的是外方套取我们的企业和市场的信息的手段是广泛的参股多个企业，似乎每一个企业所占比例都不大，但是每个企业的核心信息都被占有，同时外方还自营着与我们的合资企业有重大竞争关系的业务。我们的国家审批机构一般是形同虚设的，因为对于外方的合资要求是被当作重大的政绩的，哪里可能有否决的想法？另外一点就是我们的法律意识里面对于外方得同业禁止也没有更多的规定，我们的《公司法》最多是对于公司的经营管理人员的同业禁止，即限制董事、经理、监事，却不限制委派这些人员的股东，造成了实际的对于企业经营信息的危害。

现在外资进入我们的核心企业，我们希望的不仅仅是提供资金，有很多时候我们还是把它当作战略合作者引入的，把它当作老师给供养起来，对于他们是知无不言、言无不尽，使得他们本来占有不多的股份，取得的公司的信息和对于企业决策的影响力远远超过了他们的持股！而国际上通常的做法是限制同业投资进入董事会的，就如我们的平安投资富通，身为第一大股东也没有董事席位，如果有平安也不会遭受那样大的损失。

而外资要套取我们的行业核心信息，甚至用不着实际的进行合资、投资，只要有一定国际知名度的企业提出投资的意向，我们就从企业到政府官员就对于这个外商马首是瞻了，要什么给什么，外商只要提出一个想法，就可以逐个地把中国整个行业中上规模的企业给洽谈一个遍，而中国的企业还特别有恶性竞争、同行揭短的传统，在中国企业的互相揭发中，把所有的行业秘密都抖给了外商，最后外商对于中国行业的了解，比我们的政府和任何业内的一家企业都要多很多。
E、保险公司的外资渗透

中国的保险业被外资渗透非常严重的地方，除了我们的几大保险公司的海外上市以外，更有三大保险公司之一的中国平安被外资控股，而海外保险公司投资境内与国内公司的合资，也成立了大量的合资保险公司，整个行业可以说是对于国际金融资本透明了。

我们前面已经提出了海外上市等等各种方式，这些方式中是包括保险公司的，但是本节特意将保险公司的情况单列出来进行分析，其关键就是保险公司掌握了一个国家更加重要的信息，这些信息经常是一个国家的根本核心信息之一。

保险公司为了确定其赔付的比例和保费的收取，必须进行严格准确地精算，而这些精算所依据的资料就是整个社会的经济和人口信息，其中寿险是人口、财险是经济，所以保险公司就掌握了中国人口、社会等等几乎全部的信息，保险公司在其精算中挖掘了中国人口和经济的全部核心信息，因为保险公司的保户情况积累到一定的程度，就等于是对于中国信息的统计抽样，而且这样的抽样没有水分，谁也不能作假。

通过对于保险公司的各种数据的分析，可以对于一个国家的社会和经济进行全面的分析，控制了保险公司的核心信息，这个国家就透明了，所以保险公司对于外国的限制在西方会更进一步，从中国平安投资富通的投资，就可以看出这样的取向，首先是不让平安进入董事会，对于一个公司的最大股东没有董事席位，你在中国能够想象吗？其后比利时、荷兰和卢森堡三国不惜违反法律的办事方式处理富通公司，这在司法独立的西方社会是极其罕见的，不到非常情况绝对不会采取的。

具体的做法是这三国政府采取绕过股东会的权力，安排法国巴黎银行将以57.3亿欧元收购富通保险比利时业务100%的股权；安排荷兰政府以168亿欧元收购富通银行荷兰控股公司，包括富通集团此前收购的荷兰银行业务及富通集团荷兰保险业务；此后解体为一家资产仅含国际保险业务、结构化信用资产组合部分股权及现金的保险公司具有核心信息价值的业务就被全部转移了，平安再怎样的主张，也就是赔偿损失的事情，损失是好用钱来计算的，是简单的问题，而核心信息的价值是无价的，不好计算的事情。如果不是这样操作，在破产程序中平安作为最大股东将有巨大的权利，因为在破产程序中是最大股东主持股东会与债权人大会进行谈判，如果平安追加投资还债，就可以取得公司的所有权，而且在破产程序中股东的还债额是可以谈判减免和缓缴的。三国政府的违法操作，代价是巨大的，比利时政府集体辞职了，对于这些西方政客事前不可能不知道，明知故犯的背后一定是有更大的利益才可以，所以在此大家可以看到欧洲各国对于其国家的核心信息的重视。
F、国际咨询和国际融资

中国企业找海外战略咨询，并且造成了中国对于外国专家的迷信，似乎不论什么情况，都要进行国际咨询，但是你向他人咨询的时候，首先就要把自己的情况如实地告诉对方，你的信息就对于他们完全透明了，他们在为你服务的同时，也会利用你的信息给别人服务，你向他们咨询时他们的专业知识和信息哪里来的，光光自己研究就与大学里的书生没有区别了，更多的有价值的信息也是从其他企业的咨询时套取的。

这里需要注意的是海外的咨询商也是垄断的，还为行业内其他企业服务。就如麦肯锡服务于达能，也服务于乐百氏和娃哈哈，但是达能要收购乐百氏和娃哈哈。而海外的这些机构给你做咨询不能挖掘你的有用的信息，他们是不做的，就如麦肯锡，不是你有钱他就为你服务的，一定要你的企业够级别才可以，因为这样的企业作咨询可以得到的不仅仅是咨询费，更多的是对于这个行业的信息，麦肯锡就是通过这样的积累成为信息霸主的。这样的烧香烧出来了鬼的事情很难公开，当事人只有苦果自咽了，这是天知地知鬼知我知的事情，你没有证据的。

中国政府对外有很多的BOT项目，这些项目主要是集中在市政、道路、电力等等方面，而这些项目的融资都需要大量的信息披露给外方的，我们还有大量的项目利用世界银行贷款，在这些申请过程中也是要透露大量国家信息的，现在中国的这些海外融资，却没有进行必要的保密审查。

 
5、暗亏比明亏更加可怕

我们本文开头提到了中国在本次危机中的各种各样的巨额损失，但是中国的损失就只是这些吗？那些损失全部是中国的直接损失，对于信息战的失败与货币战争的不同之处在于信息之争的损失更多的是暗中的损失，是间接的损失，这些损失是中国没有得到的利益或者帐面上不反映的损失，而这些损失是惊人的。下面我们再以金融业海外融资和海外上市的实况为例说明这样的损失在哪里：

1. 中国工商银行：2006年，美国高盛集团、德国安联集团及美国运通公司出资37.8亿美元(折合人民币约295亿)入股工商银行，收购工行10％的股份，收购价格1.16元。

2.中国银行：苏格兰皇家银行、新加坡淡马锡控股、瑞银集团和亚洲开发银行投资中国银行共51.75亿美元(合人民币约403亿)，收购价格1.22元。

3.兴业银行：2006年，香港恒生银行、新加坡新政泰达和国际金融公司共出资27亿，以每股2.7元的价格购入兴业银行10亿股，上市后，股价达到24元多，三家外资公司净赚200多亿。

4.深圳发展银行：美国新桥投资集团以每股3.5元购买深圳发展银行3.48亿股，目前股价已达16元多，投资增殖5倍，按照深发展20亿多股计算，新桥用12.18亿获得了700多亿。

5.华夏银行：德意志银行和萨尔"奥彭海姆银行联合组成的财团将出资26亿元人民币，购入华夏银行约5.872亿股份，占华夏银行总股数的14％。每股价格4.5元，现在近10元多，净赚一倍以上。目前已被德国银行控股，500亿落入对方手中。目前德国人对华夏已形成了联合控股，该银行名义上还是中国“的”银行，实际已成为外资控股银行。

6.中国交通银行：汇丰银行（汇丰）持股交行19.9%的股权，出资144.61 亿元购买91.15亿股，每股为1.86元。交行2006年5月在香港上市，现在市价超过10港元，净赚近800多亿，07年国内A股发行上市又赚取 500多亿，合计将近1400亿，10倍回报。

7.中国建设银行：上市前美国银行和淡马锡公司分别斥资25亿美元和14.6亿美元购买建行9％和5.1%的股权，每股定价0.94元港币。发行价格2.35元港币，最高市价5.35元港币。按照目前建行共有2247亿股计算，2家净赚1300多亿港币。

8.浦东发展银行：花旗集团出资6700万美元收购浦发行4.62%的股份，超过1.8亿股，每股约2.96元，并且协议规定日后花旗集团有权收购19.9%的股份，目前浦发行股价超过23元，花旗净赚40多亿元。目前花旗尚未行权，一旦行权将赚取40亿的数倍。

9.民生银行：2004年，淡马锡控股旗下的亚洲金融公司以1.1(约8亿人民币)亿美元的价格收购民生银行2.36亿股股份，占民生银行总股份的4.55%，约3.72元，净赚约30亿。

10.广东发展银行：2006年美国花旗银行以联合收购的名义，自己出资不过60 亿，就控制了拥有3558亿元总资产、27家分行、502家网点，与世界83个国家和地区917家银行具有代理行关系，连续多年位列全球银行500强的广东发展银行。并且中国移动、国家电网和中国信托还各搭进去60亿，共180亿。把银行白白送人还要再搭进去180亿，已经完全超越了市场交换的范畴。

11.渤海银行及地方银行：另外，2005年挂牌成立的我国第一家股份制银行—— 渤海银行宣布，渣打银行以1.23亿美元购入即将成立的渤海银行19.9%的股份，成为其第二大股东。除了参股渤海银行之外，渣打银行参股光大银行有望在今年年底前完成。目前，外资银行在华进入了加速发展期，中国全部银行无一例外地已被18家外资银行参股或控制。

12.中国平安保险股份有限公司：平安是中国第一家股份制保险公司，也是第一家引进外资的保险公司，汇丰集团是平安最大外资股东，汇丰是2002年投资6亿美元，50亿人民币投资平安；平安集团04年6月24日在香港成功上市，发行价 11.88港元，又募集A股资金388亿。截至2006年6月30日，集团总资产为人民币3,587.18亿元，权益总额为人民币381.04亿元。 2007年公司市值近2000亿港币，A股5500亿人民币。

13.新华人寿：新华人寿即将上市，现在苏黎世保险持有新华人寿22800万股，每股5.25元，持股比例为19％，已成为新华人寿的最大单一股东。但实际上，目前新华人寿的实际控制者是东方集团，由于东方实业和东方集团分别持有新华人寿5％和8.02％的股权，再加上东方集团持有新华人寿其他股东的股权，东方集团直接或间接持有新华人寿的股权肯定超过20％。（据说，苏黎世通过中国公司暗中控股已超过56％，投资34亿，一旦上市，市值至少600亿）

这些交易绝大部分交易在2006年完成，再加上已经完成合资等待上市的几十家地方银行，未来显示出来的损失将更为惊人，上述低价转让到07年外资已经净赚超过1万亿人民币，现在经过世界的金融危机，世界的金融股下跌超过70%，中国的股市也腰斩，但是这些投资以目前的市价进行计算利润仍然在6000亿元以上，外资这样短期内大范围套取如此暴利，不是正常的投资所能够取得，其赚取的额外利益就是中国的暗亏。

暗亏不仅仅是损失的金融巨大损失不易察觉，更主要的是这些暗亏是各种腐败的温床，对于中国的监管机制，公开的亏损是很容易被监督的，各类的内鬼也不敢公开的进行，而这样不在账面上反映的损失，才是内鬼们可以操作的地方。
6、 西方对华信息战已经全面开动

对于中国的经济发展，西方早就采取了各种手段限制中国获取有价值的信息，并且把他提到国家安全的高度，美国的FBI早已经全面的介入了经济领域的信息之争。

根据《环球时报》报道，无论是政治领域还是经济领域，美英情报部门一直都没有放弃“中国间谍论”的立场。美国专业新闻网站“审核者”（Examiner）2月28日转述美国联邦调查局（FBI）提交给全美警长联合会的一份战略报告说，美英情报部门都认为，中国海外商业机构的间谍活动目前是他们提防的重点。

报道称，英国军情五处的反间谍部门目前对中国商业间谍在英国境内的行动“非常忧虑”，但英国情报部门的专家也不确定“具体形势已经蔓延到何种程度”。军情五处称，大约有15个外国情报部门正在英国活动，其中俄罗斯与中国嫌疑最大。

FBI的报告称，美国与英国抱有同样的忧虑。尽管 FBI怀疑俄罗斯、朝鲜、伊朗等多个国家的间谍都在美国“各取所需”，但他们最担心的还是在美国境内的2600多家中资公司。美国情报部门也称，目前的形势对于美国来说是“有史以来最复杂的时刻”，因为美国面对的不仅有传统的军方间谍，还有以非政府组织为掩护的新型间谍。美方认为，这些间谍搜罗的情报不再仅限于国防信息，而是延伸到国家能源、经济发展等方方面面。

FBI计划利用手中权力，要求对国家戒严法以及情报侦测规章给予适时调整，并获取中央情报部门的支持。FBI称，将利用周边联合力量，对在美国的外资企业和其资产运作进行调查，限制被怀疑人的行动。对于涉及美国国家资产、科技信息或是工业计划等内容的案件，FBI有权进行主导性调查。

我们要注意到的是，西方的情报机构所保护的他们的企业利益，这些企业基本上是私人的，而中国即使是国有企业，如果不是有特别地位的国企，也无法指望有中国的情报部门进行保护。

在美国的严查下，中国的留学等等人员回国就动不动的被怀疑成为美国的间谍，而且现在这里美国从来不按照他们的无罪推定和疑罪从无的司法标准进行处理，而是以各种莫须有的罪名来迫害中国的归国人员，著名的“李文和”案就这样发生了。

2006年12月18日，华人再次因“商业间谍”的罪名坐在美国法庭的被告席上。这位名叫孟晓东（音）的42岁加拿大籍华人被指控犯有36项罪行，其中包括“密谋罪、商业间谍罪、违反武器出口法罪、偷窃商业机密罪及跨国和跨州转移盗窃财物罪”等多项重要罪名。不过美国政府的起诉书并未指控孟晓东存在出售上述商业机密的事实。不管结果如何，此案是1996年美国《商业间谍法》通过以来，第三次司法当局对涉嫌牵涉到外国政府的“商业间谍”活动的人士正式提起诉讼，反映出美方密切关注硅谷在内的从事高科技行业的华人行踪。

美国对于中国的行为，我们更应当进行反思，同时我们在外交对等原则上，对于西方这样的对华政策，我们也应当有相应的政策进行对应，中国的情报机构是不能袖手旁观的，尤其是西方对于中国民营经济的掠夺，更加需要政府情报部门的力量加以保护。
7、 控制中国核心信息是遏制中国发展的根本

中国的快速崛起让世界震惊，但是在中国这样快速发展的背后，改变了世界的资源分配方式，给西方世界造成巨大的冲击，在这样的背景下遏制中国的发展也是西方世界的一个主题，西方的极右翼势力的反华叫嚣很强烈，虽然西方的很多国家表现出对于中国的友好，但是出于该国的利益这样的友好也是政治家的策略而已，中国对于自己的崛起所面临的挑战应当由充分的认识。

遏制中国的根本是在于破坏中国的可持续发展和产业升级，也就是让中国永远处于产业链的低端，不能进入产业高端。就如我们前面说提到的一流企业定标准、二流企业推品牌，三流企业搞技术，末流企业在生产，我们要进入标准和品牌的领域，最根本的就是要拥有这个产业的核心信息，掌握这个产业的发展方向，否则你永远是一个打工者的角色，等你发展了，想要提高工资了，老板就会再找一个比你更加便宜的工人来顶替你，中国目前所遭遇的东南亚的制造业的成本竞争的背景就是这样的，我们所需要的是仿效日本从当年的加工者向高端发展，想一下当年日本是如何重视一个国家的信息战略的，就可以看到世界的端倪。

在当今世界发展成为全球一体化的年代，金融制高点和货币战争成为世界各国竞争的主流的年代，关乎国家命运的信息情报就更加重要，西方势力利用货币金融手段掠夺发展中国家的财富已经是公开的秘密，而在这样看似如鲁迅所说的费厄泼赖的国际金融市场，实际上进行的是完全不对等的战争，这个不对等就是体现在信息的不对称和信息霸权之上，让你的错误判断自己把自己的资源和财富在规则下流失给西方世界，无论西方的主流公开的是什么论调，他们危机前把世界的资源和大宗商品炒作到天价，背后就是在算计中国，因为中国是新兴的经济体，增加的资源需求在中国，西方世界早就有长期协议和参股等等使得资源的价格变化影响不大。而在危机后把资源价格打入地狱，背后算计的是俄罗斯，因为加入国际市场的新增供给多半出自俄罗斯，利用资源的高价让俄罗斯担保借入巨额外债，资源的价格暴跌的背后是逼债和低价购买俄罗斯的资源产权，而暴跌对于有长期协议的西方社会，还是影响不大！所以不要说中国的套期保值要是不进行就好了，你不进行套期保值那么他的价格就不会下来，价格的持续暴涨你一样亏损，就是等你什么时候套期了，他什么时候套死你，核心信息在人家手里，他们是看着你手里的牌出牌的人，你是无法与之抗争的，信息不如人才是根本。

而西方遏制中国的发展，就是遏制中国在世界最高端的信息实力，我们的金融实力已经是具备的，我们有2万亿美元的外汇储备，而且还在不断地增加趋势中，谁也不能再说中国没有钱，但是你信息不灵，有钱就是输钱的份，国家又如何发展？所以遏制中国的崛起，就是在核心信息上制约中国，让中国的信息不灵，不断的决策失误，不断的亏损，我们若今后还是处于信息弱势，如何谈崛起？

"banana republic", not the brand

baby carrier, looks like a dead end, anyway, good start

bye bye -- mariah carey
   

靠，搞什么，SFO->BJ->SH 才750，SFO->BJ要800多，多了一个leg居然还便宜了？！

修房顶早上8点多就开始敲，昨儿还好，是在另外一边，今儿就在头顶上，巨吵，瞅了一眼天气预报还巨热，得，出门去san jose lib吧，结果很失败的是，9点过一点儿到的，发现人家11点才开门，哭死，只好在人家apartment的garage里面上网干等。。。进来以后发现cisco vpn又不work，貌似端口被封了，郁闷

中午吃的carl's jr, 热量忒大，下午赶紧去work out了一下

昨儿学到一个词evasive，猛然想到老板有时候说话也很evasive

dell的本子果然不行，天气一热风扇呼呼的转，thinkpad根本一点响声都没有

nnd，最近还特热，又怕屋顶的灰落到家里，只好门窗紧闭，又热又闷又吵！！

看了一集仙剑奇侠传 3，唉，为啥都喜欢找这种大眼小mm当女主角

CNN money今天大标题"Stay-at-home mom, six-figure salary"，所以我要坚持stay at home ...

晚上跟大师姐打电话，貌似在seattle也挺郁闷。。。

under (one's) thumb
Under the control of someone; subordinate to.

take its toll also take a toll
to cause harm or suffering
eg: Divorce takes its toll on the children involved.

转一个今年高考满分作文，现在的小孩很牛啊，俺都读不太懂，不过感觉去年的那个写汶川地震的更牛。。。。

站在黄花岗陵园的门口

清宣统三年三月二十九日(西元一九一一年四月二十七日)，广州起义暴发。起义之军百二十人持枪械攻入广州督府衙门，两广总督张鸣歧闻风而逃。然义军终因寡不敌众，数百清军围之，起义军多战死。旋革命党人潘达微见而怜之，收烈士之骸，止得七十二具，葬于白云山麓之黄花岗。九十七年之后，时值腊月，会天大雪，余滞于广州，遂至黄花岗七十二烈士之陵。止于其门，百感并至，赋诗一首，诗曰：

赤焰难明赤县天，百年群魔舞翩跹。国土已破何人见，金瓯早缺有谁怜?

皇祚不复天威去，天朝迷梦化为烟。五口通商香港失，断鸿声中夷舰现。

圆明园中尽烈火，太和殿里无君颜。水师已覆巨舰沉，黄海之水腥且咸。

春帆楼上条约订，马关之约逆臣签。大沽台上炮声隆，将士陈尸国门前。

新鬼啾啾旧鬼哭，京洼难日见炊烟。宣战诏书何处寻?言说帝后西秋狝。

辛丑条约庚子恨，落日秋风哭宝剑。六十年来伤国步，八千里外吊民残。

空向长河咒逝川，不尽国愁在斯年。四万万人齐下泪，天涯何处是神州?

民穷国敝割土地，偿银赔款年复年。可怜越女夜夜哭，半国殖民半封建。

檀香山上聚义士，兴中会中复青天。烈火已燃锤与镰，今将炮火灭清廷。

枪声惊破五羊城，英雄无惧挥宝剑。提携玉泉为国死，何得英名在人间。

悲歌一曲从天落，壮士不再歌易水。晓见江山有炊烟，烈士之魂已沉泉。

人生百年能几何，荒草斜阳土坯间。白云片片魂悠悠，黄花遍野使人愁。

义军已覆化碧土，留得精神载史书。黄花岗上土一抔，埋没荒烟蔓草间。

起事何知一死难，的卢青骢劳鞍鞯。青天白日满地红，镶开碑上覆墓间。

行人往往悲旧事，含愤长忆孙逸仙。无量头颅无量血，可怜换得假共和。

皇冠已覆君前落，不见人间少帝制。百越之人总不忘，秋风秋雨湿黄花。

愁看长江东逝去，却有青史映君前。莫悲往事愤钩沉，但看祖国焕新颜。

沧桑浮沉忆浮生，吾辈发奋应向前。岁月如潮歌似梦，百年弹指一挥间。

红尘梦里忆壮举，烈士陵前有愧颜。吾侪不曾历战火，无复见此漫硝烟。

和平岁月忆往事，史海沧茫不亲见。今春南岭雪满天，雪映梅花忠魂骨。

碧血横飞四塞惊，草木含情风云悲。只因烈士血如海，才使日月换新天。

英雄何只黄花岗，无数忠魂红旗间。百兆国子怀先辈，万里江山动后人。

召公甘为社稷死，感君总能多奉献。至今天下传英名，不使君没蔓草间。

今之河山多锦绣，不复沉沦如从前。工厂遍地多铁马，信息时代在眼前。

民众康乐少悲苦，难以再见愁容颜。吾今立于陵门口，思绪纷飞感万千。

聊诌一诗悼君魂，勿怪字拙人不见。

后记：今日之生活，皆先辈流血而成，今中国多烈士之陵，何止黄花岗耶?然吾平生只至黄花岗，愧矣。今年之秋，料黄花岗之黄花，应于秋风之中透香中华乎?